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Beyond Universality
Martha Minowt
This is a moment for heralding "feminist jurisprudence." Recently a reporter from the New York Times called me and several
others to get material for a story on this subject. She said she
thinks it is a news story: Something of note is happening as feminist work appears in law. 1 Several law reviews are holding symposia and publishing articles that call themselves feminist.2 Even the
American Association of Law Schools has included feminist jurisprudence in formal events.' This Legal Forum symposium demonstrates the current enthusiasm for feminism in law.
While I am delighted to participate, I confess I don't know
what "feminism in law" means. "Feminism" is itself an ambiguous
term. Outside of academic institutions, feminism tends to conjure
up images of street demonstrations by women. Some non-feminists
assume that feminism means opposition to the nuclear family and
to traditional traits of femininity. Others think it refers to an effort
to impose ideas of maternal care-taking as a philosophy for governing society, and associate those ideas with being forced to do
things allegedly "for one's own good" but actually in derogation of
personal freedom. Although such outsider views of feminism may
be important to some evaluations, here I will focus on meanings of
feminism chosen by those who call themselves feminists. But to
concentrate on the definitions advanced by feminists hardly resolves the question of what feminism is. Some feminists identify
themselves as those who espouse women's uniqueness.' Others reject the gender-based distinctions used historically to characterize

t Professor of Law, Harvard University. The author thanks Joe Singer, Vicky Spelman,
Mary Joe Frug, Elizabeth Schneider, Cass Sunstein and members of the Legal Forum for
help beyond reason.
' The newspaper printed the story on its law page. See Tamar Lewin, Feminist Scholars Spurring a Rethinking of Law, NY Times B9 (Sept 30, 1988).
' See, for example, Voices of Experience: New Responses to Gender Discourse, 24 Harv
CR-CL L Rev 1 (1989) (symposium); Cornell L Rev, forthcoming (symposium).
I See Symposium: Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy,Law, Theory, and Practice,
38 J Legal Educ 1 (1988). Feminism was included as one of the "emerging trends" in legal
scholarship (see AALS Program, 1986) and was the focus for the AALS Jurisprudence Section Panel in January, 1988 (see AALS Program, 1988).
' See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 22 (1988).
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men and women.5 Still others resist any comparison between men
and women as a basis for defining feminism, and at the same time
reject claims that all women have much in common. For each of
these feminists, including me, feminism is about taking all women
seriously, which requires eliciting the differences and conflicts
among women.
I will treat "feminism" as efforts to take all women seriously
by challenging the patterns of hierarchical power that have at
times excluded or degraded all, or some, women. Attention to such
patterns of power, many feminists would argue, properly leads
feminists to examine patterns of exclusion and degradation along
lines of race, class, disability, age-other traits used by some to
confine or devalue others. I join such feminists in seeking an inclusive meaning of the term, a meaning that simultaneously retains its
reference to particular, historically-situated, political movements
during this century and the last one, in which people worked to
enlarge women's rights and opportunities.
But now, what does feminism "in law" mean? I suggest, here
too, an inclusive definition: Let us refer to feminist work in litigation, legislation, legal teaching, and legal theories to advance rights
and opportunities for women. From this perspective, feminism in
law means advocacy to end restrictive treatment of all women. In
the very process of reaching this definition, I may be inviting criticism that feminism is narrow and is unresponsive to many of the
central concerns of law. This attack treats feminism as a marginal
enterprise, or claims it is not distinctive as a way of thinking or
doing law, but instead mirrors other similar advocacy efforts. Or a
critic could charge that feminism is inconsistent and incoherent,
and thus not an important contribution to legal thought or work.
Such criticisms would not worry me. Indeed, I worry instead
about their absence. To be taken seriously in the business of law
and legal scholarship means becoming the subject of sustained criticism. For feminist legal scholarship, this has not happened-yet.
Unlike scholarly reviews in literature, history, and other academic
fields,' law review articles demonstrate persistent inattention to
7
feminist scholarship by all but those who subscribe to it. Simi-

' See Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature 5 (Rowman & Allanheld,
1983).
' See, for example, Peter Shaw, Feminist Literary Criticism, The American Scholar 495
(Autumn 1988); Alice Jardine and Paul Smith, eds, Men in Feminism (Meuthen, 1987).
See also Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U Pa L Rev 561 (1984); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal
Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 Harv Women's L J 1 (1988). These
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larly, although feminists craft arguments in courts and legislatures,
seldom are their own terms used in rebuttal.' I have not seen, as
yet, a serious effort by nonfeminist scholars to criticize feminist
developments in legal scholarship, practice, and teaching. The
largely silent response may represent a form of significant criticism. Inattention itself does communicate a message of relative
disinterest or complacent disregard.9 For this very reason, the silence disturbs me. I think feminism deserves better; it deserves the
minimum degree of respect that is registered by serious criticism. 10
Judge Richard Posner's contribution to this symposium offers
an implicit critique of what many of us have called feminist jurisprudence because he rejects many of the arguments and positions
advanced by feminists while he asserts his own alternative "conservative feminism."" I predict that more direct criticism is on its
way, if only because it affords a potential growth industry in scholarship and rich material for tenure articles for those who want to
demonstrate their membership in the club of the already-tenured.
But I foresee such criticism for other reasons as well. Feminist
work challenges what has gone on before. In both its radical call
for change and its extensive reach, feminism invites response.
Feminists urge alteration of law school course materials and teach-

arguments, in turn, have elicited response. See Randall Kennedy, Critique of Minority Critique, forthcoming in 102 Harv L Rev (1989).
8 Thus, many responses to the anti-pornography campaign simply reassert the First
Amendment framework that the campaign sought to challenge when it characterized pornography as a problem of subordination and inequality. See, for example, Thomas I. Emerson, Pornographyand the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 Yale L &
Policy Rev 130 (1984). Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, accepted the defendants' characterization of the challenged restriction on
pornography as an effort to guard against the subordination of women but found this effort
too damaging to First Amendment freedoms. American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771
F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985). Feminist opponents to the regulation of pornography, in contrast,
share the concern with subordination but evaluate the impact of pornography differently,
and they argue that the depiction of sexuality can be liberating for women. See Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al, American Booksellers Ass'n v
Hudnut, reprinted in 21 U Mich J L Ref 69 (1987-88) ("FACT Brief").
' Compare Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (Random House, 1952) (describing invisibility
as the experience of deepest degradation, as a black man experiences his invisibility to
whites).
"0Some may refrain from responding to feminist legal scholarship out of fear of being
called "sexist." This fear may be quite misguided, although it may also point to the paucity
of models for scholarly dialogue besides adversarial combat. Scholarly disagreements could
explore commonalities as well as disagreements, and strengths as well as weaknesses in opposing viewpoints. In that spirit, this article attempts to take seriously the criticisms that
could be leveled against feminist legal work while also challenging the assumption that either the criticisms or the defenses against them should define the scope of debate.
" Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U Chi Legal F 191.
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ing methods, revision of legal doctrines, and reevaluation of basic
categories and modes of legal knowledge and action. Feminist arguments are appearing in more and more places, even within these
halls. The response from women law students and lawyers is often
welcoming and at least attentive. Growing numbers of women in
legal practice and in law teaching are struggling to come to terms
with their positions in often hostile and antagonistic environments,
and many, myself included, turn to feminism only after finding
prevailing legal theories and practices inadequate and, at times,
debasing. And just as men in other fields have found feminist work
challenging and deserving attention, men in law are beginning to
read and teach feminist work. The sheer adversariness of the legal
profession guarantees that in the midst of all this interest in feminism, criticism is on its way.
Just in case the critics remain uninterested, or tongue-tied, let
me give them some help. When the criticism comes, I think it will
gravitate to the three points I have already mentioned: (1) feminism in law is unresponsive to central issues of legal doctrine and
jurisprudence; (2) feminism offers no distinctive legal doctrines or
legal theories; and (3) feminism is inconsistent and incoherent.
I will elaborate upon these criticisms, and respond to them.
My chief hope is to advance the kind of dialogue that I think feminist work invites. In doing so, I shall strive to maintain the commitment to take the perspective of others that informs much feminist theoretical work. My responses to the criticisms I anticipate,
however, may fall subject to a new round of the same critiques.
You may think that some of my responses fail to address the challenges, or that they do so in ways that show nothing distinctive, or
that exemplify-even revel in-inconsistency. Do not think this is
undeliberate. If you do not understand or absorb my responses,
this may be a sign of the distance between the assumptions you
hold and those that underlie this article. My assumptions constrain
what I see, as do yours. Yet, even if we only glimpse how we misunderstand one another, we can recognize the significance of our
own partiality. This recognition, I argue, would itself reflect and
further efforts to take feminism seriously.
I. Is

FEMINISM UNRESPONSIVE TO CENTRAL ISSUES OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE?

A critic might say that feminism is a curiosity, but a marginal
movement in law and legal scholarship. It might lead a teacher of
criminal law to add new materials for a day's session on rape; it
may animate and divide a constitutional law class during discus-
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sions of abortion and pornography. It may contribute to marginal
and optional courses like sex discrimination and family law. But
whatever it may mean, feminism, according to this critic, is about
women, not everyone; feminism has little to do with central legal
themes such as economic efficiency, democratic legitimacy, or the
choices between rules and discretion, deterrence and punishment,
and procedural formality and substantive fairness.
In this same vein, a young member of the faculty may include
in a jurisprudence class some articles on "feminist jurisprudence"
to serve as a contrast to law and economics, legal process, and critical legal studies. More likely, the teacher will assign excerpts from
Carol Gilligan's In A Different Voice 2 on the theory that the feminist legal work is largely an application of this book on moral and
psychological development. After all, the teacher will maintain,
feminist legal scholars have not offered any explicit, much less systematic, contributions to the area of jurisprudence. Jurisprudential
questions address the central issues in law. These questions traditionally include: What should be the relationship between law and
morals; what should be the role of the state in a free society; what
justifications and restraints are there to guide judicial discretion
and to address the counter-majoritarian difficulty; what is the relative priority of the right and the good; and what scheme for redistributive justice adequately accounts for the tension between desert and need? Taking all women seriously, with attention to the
hierarchical patterns of power that have excluded or degraded
them, may be interesting, but it is at best an area for application of
one or another jurisprudential insight and does not constitute a
method of inquiry or new set of principles.
In law practice, feminism may obtain attention when a male
judge orders a female attorney to use her husband's name when
she appears in court,"3 or when a state-wide commission reports on
the negative treatment of women in the judicial system."' In these
brief moments of publicity, the critic will observe, feminist perspectives address only the discrete question of the treatment of
women by men in complex systems of courts, bureaucracies, and

" Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Harvard University Press, 1982).
" See Editorial, Better Behavior, National Law Journal 12 (July 25, 1988) (discussing
the insistence of U.S. District Judge Herbert J. Teitelbaum of Pittsburgh that a lawyer use
her husband's surname in his courtroom and Judge Teitelbaum's subsequent apology for his
actions).
" See New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, Summary Report (Unified Court
System, Office of Court Administration, 1986).
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legal rules. In this context, feminists may point out a need for minor adjustments-exemplified by the recent adoption to the federal procedural rules of degendered language amendments that left
the entire substance of the rules unchanged. Feminism may remind people to be polite, mannerly, and attentive to the special
sensitivities of women, but it hardly represents a significant alternative to the methods, analyses, and institutions of law, or so a
critic might charge.
If this is the criticism, here is an initial response: The marginality of feminism as a body of theory and practice reveals the problem that we as feminists identify and work to change. Feminists
seek to change the historic use of power as a mechanism to exclude, marginalize, or degrade women, and simultaneously to treat
the very exclusion and marginalization it has brought about as a
natural or objective judgment about what is true and valuable.
This response to the marginality criticism is actually two-fold.
First, feminists challenge this use of power both by relating legal
debates to the specific experiences of women and by expanding
upon the very debates critics consider to be central. Second, not
only do feminists address central issues in law, but they also challenge the very process by which certain issues are defined as central. By looking at the specific ways in which women are marginalized, feminism provides a critique of the process by which new
problems are analyzed, assessed, and judged through old ways of
looking at problems. At the same time, feminism questions
whether issues which do not fit in the old categories should become
marginal concerns.
Let's take each response in turn. Feminism is not marginal because feminists do advance a range of views about concerns treated
as central in law. If taken seriously and included within law school
courses, scholarly debates, and law practice, feminists have direct
contributions to make to classic legal issues. The perspectives of
feminist writers all derive from attention to the experiences of
women and other traditionally excluded or relatively powerless
groups. Moving from this starting point, feminists offer new insights into such issues as the choices between rules and discretion,
as in Frances Olsen's work on the expansion of state power in the
movement from a maternal preference rule to a best interests of
the child standard permitting discretion in child custody determinations."0 Robin West has shown how feminist and male scholar-

" Frances Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 J Law & Ineq 1 (1984).
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ship share conundrums-and she has thereby shed new light on
both kinds of work.' 6 Feminists have also introduced victims' perspectives to debates about deterrence and punishment conceptions, 1 7 and arguments about the relevance of social and economic
circumstances to the evaluation of criminal culpability. 8 Judith
Resnik, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, and Lisa Lerman have each contributed striking viewpoints about the proper relationships between procedural formality and substantive fairness.' 9 Christine
Littleton and Wendy Williams both teach us about ways to revise
assumptions about neutrality that are buried within the law.2 ° The
apparent marginality of feminist work is a function of other people's decisions to exclude it, not anything intrinsic to the work itself. If feminist work were taken seriously, it could not be understood as marginal.
This first response is unsatisfactory, however, if it puts feminist work in a supplicant role, seeking approval by others. Nor is it
satisfactory if it seems to call for a kind of affirmative action for
feminist work. In its own terms, this first response requires that we
"6West, 55 U Chi L Rev 1 (cited in note 4) (showing commonalities between mainstream and critical legal scholarship by men, and divergence among feminists along lines
that also divide some male scholars).
"7See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L J 1087 (1986) (urging revision of rape laws in
light of what women mean when they say "no"); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U
Chi Legal F 23 (exhorting that we consider the victim's perspective in the context of
battering).
"SSee Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 NYU L Rev 589 (1986) (discussing origins of and justifications
for the battered women's defense).
19 Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 Harv Women's L J 57 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L
Rev 754 (1984); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations
for our Judges, 61 S Cal L Rev 1877 (1988).
20 See Note, Toward A Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 Harv L Rev 487 (1981)
(written by Christine Littleton while a student at Harvard Law School); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L Rev 1279 (1987); Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
NYU Rev L & Soc Change 325 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women's Rights L Rptr 175 (1982). See
also Littleton, 1989 U Chi Legal F 23 (cited in note 17) and Wendy W. Williams, Notes
From A First Generation, 1989 U Chi Legal F 99. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
Colum L Rev 1118 (1986); Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 BU L Rev 55 (1979); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955 (1984); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An Essay, 95 Yale L J 1373 (1986); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question
Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 Berkeley Women's L J 64 (1985).
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judge feminist legal work on the same basis that we judge all other
work, no more and no less critically. Introducing an affirmative action program raises questions about what standards would be appropriate and implies a quota, listing the number of feminist articles that should be assigned in a classroom or the number of
women lawyers a law firm should hire. I have no interest in involving myself with these problems, and they miss my point. My point
is simply that any charge of marginality reflects ignorance of the
work itself, since much of feminist work does respond directly to
dominant themes and dilemmas in law. A feminist interest in creating a basis for legal recovery to individuals damaged by the production and distribution of pornography, for example, may, after a
superficial examination, seem remote from central themes of constitutional law and may also seem an obvious assault on basic First
Amendment freedoms. Yet, a closer look can reveal how the feminist challenge to pornography depends upon and advances a conception of liberty and a conception of equality, central themes in
American constitutional law.2" Marginality, then, is a construction
placed on the work, not something inherent in it.
The second response to the charge that feminism is unresponsive to central issues of legal doctrine and hence is a marginal
movement emphasizes how feminism itself provides a critique of
what has made it marginal, and this critique points toward remaking all of law.2 2 The charge of marginality presumes that what has
been treated as central should be so treated, and what has been
called mainstream justifiably sets the norm that defines alternatives as marginal. Feminist work challenges this assumption, and
in so doing, engages what we know and how we judge as problems
for debate, not merely building blocks in law.
The debate feminists seek to inspire may go neglected or misunderstood, however, if the feminist challenge is construed, unthinkingly, in terms of the mainstream categories and questions
that themselves are subject to feminist challenge. As an example,
considering and assessing feminist arguments within the
frameworks of libertarianism, utilitarianism or any other pre-existing "ism" risks imposing these prior frameworks on feminist
thought and results in a misunderstanding of the feminist chal2, See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv CRCL L Rev 1 (1985); Cass Sunstein, Pornographyand the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L J
589. 51
This may, in some respects, seem inconsistent
with the first response. For a general
discussion explaining and defending inconsistency in feminist arguments, see pp 134-38.
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lenge to all such frameworks. Similarly, treating feminism simply
as the equity side of a division between equity and law tames and
confines feminism within a predefined scheme.2 3 To ward off or
correct such misunderstandings, let me explain this point more
fully by turning to the issue of knowledge.
How we orient ourselves depends on what we think we already
know. That is why Columbus called the people he encountered on
this continent "Indians." Although I readily acknowledge that we
cannot sort through our perceptions without reference to some categories we have already learned,2 4 complacency about these categories may close us off from insights-and may leave us quite mistaken about what we see.2 5 Feminist work challenges familiar
reference points for knowledge. Familiar reference points may be
very familiar because they stem from dominant ways of knowing,
ways that make other perspectives less familiar, even less able to.
be expressed.
It may be familiar, for example, to think about free exercise of
religion in terms of the kinds of worship and ritual associated with
Christianity. It is possible, then, to extend the reference points to a
less dominant, but still assimilable, religion, such as Judaism, and
find the counterpart elements of religious exercise. We may ask of
Judaism, as we ask of Christianity, what is the day of Sabbath rest,
what are the holidays that deserve freedom from the demands of
work, who is the religious leader in the community, and so forth.
Yet, other religions may less easily graft onto this model of the
familiar religion. There may be no day of rest; there may be a
sense of hours of the day rather than distinctive days during which
religious observance demands setting aside gainful work; there may
be no "leader" in a recognizably hierarchical form. Clinging to its
own familiar reference points, a Supreme Court may fail to recognize as religious a Native American tribe's belief that a particular
spot, and its remoteness from competing, humanly-made activities,
is central to religious observance.2 6
23 See Posner, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 191 (cited in note 11).

" See George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal
about the Mind (University of Chicago Press, 1987); William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of
Life's Ideals 229 (Henry Holt, 1913). See also Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970).
' Gunter Frankenberg, CriticalComparisons:Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv
Intl L J 411, 416-26 (1985). See also Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism (W. H.
Freeman, 1983) (biography of Barbara McClintock, Nobel prize-winning biologist).
"6 See Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 SCt 1319 (1988). The
current debate over what counts as a "burden" on free exercise of religion demonstrates the

124

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1989:

Analogously, it may seem familiar to compare women to men
in addressing questions of sex discrimination. Is it gender-based
discrimination to deny insurance coverage for pregnancy and childbirth expenses? A Supreme Court could answer no, assuming it
uses an analysis that takes a man as the norm and finds some
women, i.e., non-pregnant ones, able to be like the man.2 7 Given
this division of the world into pregnant and non-pregnant persons,
and given the recognition that both women and men fit within the
non-pregnant category, the Court could conclude that pregnant
and child-bearing women do not present a specifically genderbased characteristic worthy of legal protection.2 8 When Congress
specifically rejected this conclusion and amended Title VII to treat
employment distinctions drawn with reference to pregnancy as impermissible gender discrimination,29 the prevalence of a male reference point of view persisted. Programs affording pregnancy and
maternity leave therefore were prone to challenge as violations of
the ban against gender discrimination, since they treated women
differently-in this case, better-than men.
In a somewhat tortured opinion, the Supreme Court did conclude that this challenge would undermine the purpose of the Title
VII amendment, and that the reference point here should no
longer be men who are presumed to lack major child-care responsibilities.3 0 Instead, the Court reasoned, the reference point for the
purposes of analyzing alleged discrimination should be any
worker's need to combine work and family responsibilities.3 1 In
this way, the Court challenged familiar assumptions that treat
men's experiences as the norm and adopted feminist arguments
advanced by Christine Littleton, Judith Resnik, and Wendy
Williams. 2
The point here is not to enshrine some view of a woman's excontrast between the use of reference points familiar to the majority, and the competing
demand to consider "subjective" or minority viewpoints. Compare Ira C. Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv L Rev
933 (1989) with Case Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 102 Harv L Rev 143, 232
(1988) (discussing Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n).
27 See Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484, 496-97 (1974); General Electric Co v Gilbert,
429
US 125 (1976).
" See Geduldig, 417 US at 496-97.

" Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 USC § 2000e(k) (1982).
80 CaliforniaFederal Savings and Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 107 SCt 683 (1987).
21

Id at 694.

See Littleton, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 31 (cited in note 17); Williams, 1989 U Chi
Legal F at 100 (cited in note 20); and Judith Resnik, Complex Feminist Conversations,1989
U Chi Legal F 1. See also Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J
Legal Educ 47 (1988).
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perience as the reference point, but instead to reconsider the assumed reference point after including previously excluded versions
of women's needs and interests. If pursued, this demand to include
excluded perspectives means a continual challenge to familiar resting points. A next step here, for example, would query the assumption that the accommodation of work and family life concerns only
parental duties to children. Doesn't this leave out the responsibilities adult children may have to their ailing parents, or to other
close associates in need?3"
Seemingly stable categories for sorting through experiences
become subject to questions in light of feminist work.3 4 Feminist
legal work mirrors the drama staged by feminist work in many
fields: The revelation of the excluded offers a challenge to remake
what we thought we knew.3 5 When brought to bear on law, feminist
questions concern not merely the treatment of women compared to
men in various settings, but they also address more profound questions such as what should count as a harm for the purposes of tort
law?" Why does the harm have to entail physical injury, or a harm
that a white adult man could experience?3 7 Why does the cause
relevant to plaintiff recovery have to be traceable to another person, as opposed to a social pattern or practice? Why can't harm
include the depiction of a particular group in mass media and privately produced images? 8 Some feminist challenges have already
promoted alternative theories of harm and legal protections sufficiently to alter public debate. For example, whatever one concludes about the advisable legal treatment of pornography, we
know, after reading the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, that it cannot be characterized only as free speech; it
must also be catalogued as a kind of injury. The categories for
making sense of the world are not natural and free from human

'3 See Nadine Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 381 (1984-85).
" See generally Marsha P. Hanen, Feminism, Objectivity, and Legal Truth in Lorraine
Code, Sheila Mullett and Christine Overall, eds, Feminist Perspectives: PhilosophicalEssays on Method and Morals 29 (University of Toronto Press, 1988).
3' See Barbara Johnson, A World of Difference (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
'6 See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J Legal
Educ 3 (1988); Lucinda Finley, Feminism and Torts (unpublished manuscript).
" See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Yale University Press, 1979).
8 See Andrea Dworkin, Pornography:Men Possessing Women (Women's Press, 1981);
MacKinnon, 20 Harv CR-CL L Rev 1 (cited in note 21); Sunstein, 1986 Duke L J 589 (cited
in note 21). See also Robert Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography,Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Cal L Rev 297 (1988).
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choice. Feminist analysis introduces alternative frameworks for
sorting out perceptions of the world, and in this way, challenges
the very reference points that in the past have defined what is central and what is marginal.
An example can illuminate how feminist analysis remakes categories for understanding experiences, and in so doing, responds to
central concerns of law while redefining them. Many people have
debated policies surrounding what has been called, "surrogate
motherhood," a decision by a woman to enter into a contractual
arrangement with a man (and often his wife) to conceive and bear
a child and then turn the child over to the couple in exchange for a
defined amount of compensation. 9 What should happen if the woman who conceives and bears the child changes her mind and
wants to keep the infant? Some have maintained that "the feminist position" demands a grant of power to this woman in recognition of the intimacy of the child-bearing experience and the limits
of her ability to know ahead of time what she will feel about surrendering the child. Others have argued that "the feminist position" requires respect for the contract in order to secure equal regard to the autonomy and self-determination of women to match
the law's regard to men's autonomy and self-determination. Creating an exception to contract enforcement here, some maintain,
reintroduces notions of women's vulnerabilities and disabilities
that law historically cited in denying women the power to enter
into contracts.4 0
Neither of these views, I would suggest, is particularly more
feminist than the other; both "take women seriously" and both pay
some attention to issues of power and degradation. But the more
probing inquiry afforded by feminist analysis looks at the context
in which such contracts are made. Why does this kind of contract
become an attractive option to any woman, and how does this relate to women's other options, or lack of options, to earn money,
especially while raising a family of their own? Why does the contracting couple come to the conclusion that the child they want
must be biologically linked to them, or to the man in the
couple-and that this contractual arrangement is preferable to
adoption of an otherwise unwanted child?4" These questions
reformulate the problem raised by surrogate mother contracts by

" See Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (Harvard University Press, 1988); Jane
Maslow Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism,Pessimism, 67 BU L Rev, 105 (1987).
4" See Colloquy: In Re Baby M, 76 Georgetown L J 1717 (1988).
" Remarks of Elizabeth Bartholet, Harvard Divinity School (Oct 5, 1988).
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situating those contracts in the deeper social arrangements and attitudes around paid work and parent/child relationships. The reformulation itself does not yield an answer about a particular dispute, nor even about the preferable social arrangements in an ideal
society. The reformulation does, however, change the factors that
would be relevant to both general and specific discussions about
the issue.42
Here is another example of the shift in perspectives enabled
by feminist analysis. In Philadelphia, as in many cities, the public
school system historically maintained an all-boys high school as
the finest high school in the city system. 43 Although it had long
excluded girls, it is called Central High School-a rather vivid
demonstration of how dominant institutions have marginalized females and then treated the results as natural. Philadelphia also
created an all-girls school, called Girls' High School, which held a
lower position in the competitive educational pecking order in the
school system. Indeed, the boys attending Central routinely disparaged the girls at Girls' High as less intelligent than themselves. A
lawsuit challenging the exclusion of girls from Central High School
ultimately produced an order directing an end to the exclusion of
girls." This result could have been achieved largely through liberal
legal theory: The litigants could simply have argued that on any
relevant criterion, the girls and the boys were the same and thus
there was no good reason for excluding the girls from Central High
School.
Yet, after the integration of Central High, Girls' High remains
segregated by sex. No one sought to introduce boys to the school.
Indeed, some feminists would argue that there is an important role
for single-sex schools for females, given the historical and continuing practices of discrimination against them, even while denying
42

See also Sheila Mullett, Shifting Perspective: A New Approach to Ethics in Femi-

nist Perspectives 109, 117-18 (cited in note 34) (discussing in vitro fertilization by shifting
from utilitarian or contractual questions to an examination of the social arrangements and
values that make in vitro fertilization seem a good solution to women's infertility).
" Information provided by Michelle Fine, University of Pennsylvania School of
Education.
" In Vorchheimer v School Dist of Philadelphia,430 US 703 (1977) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court affirmed a Third Circuit opinion holding that, with the exception of "the
science field," the sexually segregated high schools for high achievers were "comparable"
and hence did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Vorchheimer, 532 F2d 880, 882 (1976). Subsequently, however, a Pennsylvania court struck
down the maintenance of single-sex public schools as a violation state constitution's Equal
Rights Amendment and, because of the disparate quality of education subsequently proven,
of the Equal Protection Clause as well. Newberg v Board of Public Ed, 26 Dec & Cases 682
(1983).
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the value of single-sex schools for males at this point in history.4 5
The co-educational enrollment at Central High, however, has not
eradicated the initial problems concerning gender at that school.
People working to implement the judicial remedy at Central High
have discovered that nothing in the curriculum, counseling program, or other institutional arrangements at Central was changed
when girls were admitted; the girls who got in on the theory that
they were like the boys are simply expected now to be like the
boys. And now, perhaps fulfilling that vision, it is both boys and
girls enrolled at Central who look down upon the girls enrolled at
Girls' High.
A feminist analysis would criticize this development. Assimilating the girls to the model of the boy student at Central High has
led to what might even be called sexist attitudes by the Central
High girls toward the Girls' High girls. That sexism, as it turns
out, is not due to sex but to gender. To understand this development, we need to reconsider the category of gender and entertain
the possibility that it signifies and summarizes social attitudes and
roles, rather than biologically different bodies. This understanding
requires remaking a basic category we use to know the world. And
this understanding permits a different way of judging the judicial
remedy and its consequences, a way that probes into the pattern of
power preserved by the remedy. It is not enough to alter the numbers of female bodies now studying next to male ones if the exclusion and degradation of females continues at the hands of the biological females who have been invited to assume the gender of the
boys at Central High School.
Feminism offers the deeper challenge to the meanings of gender and to the treatment of groups by one another. Feminists pursue these deeper challenges by paying attention to the relationship
between knowledge and power. In so doing, feminists join theorists
influenced by Hegel, Marx, Freud, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Foucault,
Derrida, and Arendt. These European social theorists contribute to
continental philosophic traditions that until ,recently have found
little hospitality in this country. But in the very act of shoring up
feminist insights by noting their similarity to or harmony with the
insights of other contemporary traditions, I invite the second criticism: What makes feminism distinctive?

See Chai R. Feldblum, Nancy Fredman Krent and Virginia G. Watkin, Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations,21 Harv CR-CL L Rev 171 (1986). Also see Deborah L.
Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw U L Rev 106 (1986).
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DOES FEMINISM FAIL TO OFFER DISTINCTIVE LEGAL DOCTRINES
OR LEGAL THEORIES?

If feminism's contributions to legal theory arise through demonstrating links between categories of knowledge and patterns of
power, then feminism begins to look a lot like other emerging
trends in legal theory, such as critical legal studies and some forms
of law and literature. Similarly, if feminism's contributions to legal
practice appear in a sustained challenge to the exclusion or degradation of women effectuated or countenanced by law, then feminism begins to look much like other civil rights efforts waged on
behalf of members of racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, or persons with disabilities. And if feminism's contributions to law teaching call for more humane classrooms, modulating or leveling the
traditional hierarchical "paper chase" classroom, and increasing
the respect for students' own experiences as a basis for knowledge
and for criticizing law, then feminism begins to resemble other developments in legal pedagogy, most notably, humanistic, clinical,
and critical legal studies."6 These observations, then, raise the
question: Does feminism in law offer anything distinctive?
The answer to this question is both yes and no. The major
source of distinctiveness for feminism's contributions to law comes
from the insistence on incorporating women's insights and concerns. Since traditional legal doctrines, theories, and teaching
methods did not consult or even take account of women, this feminist injunction calls for new content and new methods arising from
consultations with women. The wellspring of women's lived experiences provides a rich resource, and the very emphasis on checking
legal theories, rules, and practices in light of actual experiences itself presents an opportunity for innovation and reform.47
Very quickly, however, we reach a problem. Which women
would feminists consult? No one subgroup of women can represent
" For critical views of legal education, see Elizabeth Dvorkin, Jack Himmelstein, and
Howard Lesnick, Becoming A Lawyer: A Humanistic Perspective on Legal Education and
Professionalism (West Publishing Company, 1981); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education-A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J Legal Educ 612 (1984); Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J Legal Educ 591 (1982); Karl E.
Klare, The Law- School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J Legal Educ 336 (1982);
Michael Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 33 J Legal Educ 624 (1983). For works on feminist pedagogy, see Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts:A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am U L Rev 1065 (1985); Catharine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraisingthe Male Models of Law School Teaching, 38 J Legal Educ 155 (1988);
Sallyanne Payton, Releasing Excellence: Erasing Gender Zoning from the Legal Mind, 18
Ind L Rev 629 (1985).
See Schneider, 61 NYU L Rev 589 (cited in note 18).
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all women. Several feminist legal scholars have already highlighted
the dangers in treating the perspective of white, middle-class, ablebodied women as the sole feminist perspective. More and more
feminists have begun to emphasize this point."8 The danger, I
would argue, is the risk of departing from the stringent demands of
feminism, rather than a risk inherent in it. Taking all women seriously means recognizing the multiplicity of women's experiences.
Women of color, disabled women, working class women and women
on welfare, women rape survivors and women police officers,
women with AIDS and women who are physicians, women judges
and women criminal defendants all matter, say feminists, and taking them all seriously would dramatically change the construction
of the "person" presumed by legal doctrines, legal institutions, and
law school classrooms.
Yet, this very multiplicity raises a conundrum: Searching out
the variety of women's perspectives seems to undermine the claim
of a distinct feminist contribution. Some feminists may respond
that there still are essential female traits, experiences, or capacities
that transcend our differences and provide a distinctive foundation
for a feminist perspective. Some identify particular issues, such as
peace, hunger, and protection of children, as quintessentially
women's concerns.'9 I find these claims unpersuasive. We have
plenty of evidence that not all women agree on such issues nor on
conceptions of what traits, experiences, or capacities are uniquely
and distinctively female.5 0 Second-guessing women on such issues
not only takes us into the quagmire of debates over whether some
people are deluded about their own interests, but also risks undermining the commitment to take all women seriously. Taking all
women seriously should mean respecting women's own conceptions
48 See Mary Becker, Politics,Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U Chi Legal F 169

(evoking the situation of economically disadvantaged women); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U Chi Legal F 139;
Deborah L. Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View", 38 J Legal Educ 39 (1988). See also
Marilyn Frye, On Being White: Thinking Toward A Feminist Understanding of Race and
Race Supremacy, in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory 110 (The Crossing
Press, 1983); Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center (South End Press, 1984);
Barbara Omolade, Black Women and Feminism in Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds,
The Future of Difference 247 (Rutgers University Press, 1980); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon Press, 1988).
4" See, for example, Ann Scales, Violence and War, Speech to the 1988 Critical Legal
Studies Conference (Oct 2, 1988).
80 Women's active involvement in both major political parties in the United States, and
in opposite camps in the abortion, pornography, and maternity leave debates gives some
evidence of this.
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of themselves and their interests.5
The idea of finding an essence of female identity that could
unify women is itself made suspect by recent feminist work. A significant intellectual contribution of feminism is the demonstration
that such seemingly empirical conditions as gender identity are
fundamentally cultural constructions. 2 Science and other means
for establishing objective facts have themselves become subjects
for questioning by feminist critiques rather than neutral means for
validating claims. There remains no settled ground for establishing
what is essentially female, even if we should want to. Instead, immersion in the historically contingent and culturally constructed
meanings of gender and the distinctive perspectives of different
groups of women, I believe, offers the avenues of analysis and critique that implement feminist commitments to take all women
seriously.
Rather than fold in the face of diversity, and rather than resurrect some singular essence of femaleness, feminists can interrogate the question of distinctiveness itself. Why is it so important
for feminism to be distinctive, as that notion has been understood?
The preoccupation with distinctiveness shows a preoccupation
with pinning things down: with knowing by categorizing and dividing, claiming, naming and blaming, and with tracking ownership of
things and ideas. Some would characterize these preoccupations as
male. They also fit a description of Western cultural conceptions of
knowledge, in contrast to Eastern and African conceptions.5 ' Fascination with tracing distinctive ownership of things and ideas risks
distracting feminists from challenging the patterns of thought that
historically excluded women 54 and risks forcing us to fight over the
few, if any, remaining plots of ground left.
" See Elizabeth V. Spelman, On Treating Persons as Persons, 88 Ethics 150 (1978).
Spelman also argues that perceptions by others are relevant and important to taking any
person seriously.

"2 See, for example, Ruth Bleier, Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and Its
Theories on Women (Pergamon Press, 1984); Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and
Science (Yale University Press, 1985).
" See, for example, Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism 136-96 (Cornell University Press, 1986) (discussing Eastern and African philosophies that emphasize
each person's connections to the whole society or to nature, with consequences for theories
of knowledge and of the good). See generally Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds,
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science (D Reidel Publishing Company, 1983).
" An emphasis on naming distinctive artists, for example, has undervalued "women's
work" in needlework and crafts, and neglected those whose social positions made it unlikely
their names would become visible. See, for example, Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own
(Harcourt, Brace & World, 1929) (imagining Shakespeare's sister).
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Instead of falling into the trap of defending what makes feminism distinctive, let us note and celebrate what feminism shares
with other traditions.5 5 This would acknowledge our mutual dependence upon one another in coming to know and to create, not to
mention to live. The feminist concern in law for hearing about the
lived experiences of all women and renovating legal categories and
institutions in light of these experiences invites attention to all
who have been excluded.56 Including the excluded means remaking
rules about participation. A commitment to seek out, hear, and redress continued or new exclusions must lead white feminists to
consult women of color, able-bodied feminists to talk with disabled
women, young feminists to confer with elderly women, and all feminists to seek out women they do not know or understand. This
commitment, I believe, also requires that feminists consider the experiences of men as well as women whose concerns have been excluded from attention because of the traits that both share.
In each of its strategies, feminist work bears some analogy to
some forms of critical theory, some liberation theories, and some
skeptical and pragmatic efforts to join theory and practice. Like
the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school, like Hegelians and
like American pragmatists,5 7 and like some proponents of the scientific method,5 8 feminists emphasize practice as a resource for
theory and criticize theories removed from the test of concrete experiences. Like many who have challenged formalism in academic
work, feminists are skeptical of abstraction for wiping the fingerprints of historical contexts off ideas and concepts that have real
weight in the world. Like many 20th century continental male theorists, feminists raise epistemological questions alongside moral
and political ones, and question the idea of one truth or one reality
that can be discerned and agreed upon by all.5 9 Perhaps paradoxi15Somewhat similar, and somewhat different, arguments appear in West, 55 U Chi L
Rev 1 (cited in note 4) (showing divisions among feminist theorists and connections between
supposedly adverse male theorists, thus remaking usual assumptions about these theorists).
" See, for example, Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchyin David
Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 294 (Pantheon, 1st ed 1982); Schneider, 61 NYU L Rev 589 (cited in note 18).
See Scales, 95 Yale L J 1373 (cited in note 20); Joan Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 NYU L Rev 429
(1987).
58 See, for example, John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of
Knowledge and Action (Putnam, 1960).
" Compare Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University
Press, 1979) with Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (cited in note 53); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635 (1983); and Scales, 95 Yale L J 1373 (cited in note 20). For a demonstra17
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cally, feminists join some critics of empiricism, at least in its posi-

tivist forms, while also adhering to some views of science that all
have a focus on phenomena and experience rather than on formal
ideas. Thus, along with many contemporary critics of Western science and positivism in social science, feminists explore ways of
knowing and writing that claim kinship with literature and that
emphasize constructed or chosen meanings rather than external realities." Yet, feminists unite with pragmatists, and some kinds of
social scientists in emphasizing the significance of experience as a
check and as a resource for knowledge.
In addition, feminist work shares with other approaches the
view that conflict, rather than consensus, characterizes human perceptions and values, and depictions of individual and social life
that deny conflict are untrustworthy and are likely to suppress
viewpoints of some people." Feminist work shares with communitarianism and republicanism a criticism of the conception of the
individual self as fundamentally autonomous and bounded. Feminists, along with these others, propose a view of the self as importantly connected with others, constituted through membership in
groups and affiliations through relationships of love, care, and
duty.2 Like some social theorists, historians, anthropologists, and
writers of fiction, feminists try to highlight what may be contingent and mutable about contemporary experience by drawing contrasts with other human possibilities. Consistent even with law and
economics, feminists demand to know the first and second order
consequences of legal rules. Furthermore, like many excellent lawyers, feminist theorists try to revise categories of analysis to assure
that the categories serve envisioned ends rather than becoming
ends in themselves.
By this time, some critics now will ask, if feminism shares so
much with numerous different theories, many of which conflict
with each other, isn't feminism then inconsistent and incoherent?
The surrogate motherhood example explicitly identified competing
tion of the conflicting views among feminist theorists themselves, see Ellen C. DuBois, Mary
C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon and Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buff L Rev 11 (1985).
60 See Harding and Hintikka, Discovering Reality (cited in note 53).
' Some feminists emphasize an approach toward problems that pursues accommodation and negotiation rather than win-or-lose confrontations. See, for example, Gilligan, In a
Different Voice (cited in note 12). Yet, work of this sort emphasizes the conflict in ways of
knowing and solving problems-conflict often along gender lines-that is too often suppressed in accounts that claim uniformity in human experience. See id.
2 See, for example, Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 98 Yale L J 1493 (1988); Cass
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 98 Yale L J 1539 (1988).
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arguments that can be and have been labeled "feminist," and the
very strategy here of claiming feminism's distinctiveness and then
abandoning that claim is obviously inconsistent. What is the value
of an approach that would deliberately present such incoherence
and inconsistency? This is the third line of criticism I will
consider.
III. Is

FEMINISM INCONSISTENT AND INCOHERENT?

What if, for argument's sake, I concede that feminism is inconsistent, and yes, often apparently incoherent? I then would ask,
compared to what, and why does this matter? 63 A self-identified
feminist may switch sides on an issue, such as how important is
privacy, depending on the context (although she may also be contrasting privacy for an individual with privacy for a family unit).
Alternatively, avowed feminists make opposing claims about pornography, maternity leave, and sexuality. Whatever feminism is,
then, it may seem to support inconsistent positions and offer little
power, on its own, to resolve debates of importance to its
adherents.
Feminists do disagree and a given feminist may join my line of
argument on one issue, but switch sides on another. Obvious examples of inconsistency appear in the debates waged among feminists
ourselves, internal arguments shared with the public. Contemporary feminists -have visibly and vocally differed over whether pornography should give rise to civil sanctions,64 and whether maternity leave policies should be understood as violating federal bans
against sex discrimination.6 5 Historically, feminists have debated
and disagreed about protective labor legislation, the Equal Rights
Amendment, and about the meanings of women's labor histories in
judging the causes of occupational segregation by employers such

11

It could be argued that other prevailing approaches to law are inconsistent and inco-

herent; scholars associated especially with critical legal studies have advanced such arguments about "liberal legalism" and about "law and economics." See Joseph William Singer,
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L J 1 (1984). I will not do
more here than note that criteria of consistency and coherence are often applied but seldom
met. In addition, inconsistent positions often emanate from those who oppose changing the
status quo. In commenting on this paper, Cass Sunstein recalled a particular professor who
would respond to proposals for change with one of two inconsistent responses: "We've already done that," or, "we've never done that before."
11 Compare Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law (Harvard University Press, 1987) with FACT Brief, 21 U Mich J L Ref 69 (cited in
note 8). See also Sunstein, 1986 Duke L J 589 (cited in note 21).
11 See generally Finley, 86 Colum L Rev 1118 (cited in note 20) (describing the conflicting views).
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as Sears, Roebuck & Company." Some feminists criticize corporate
law firms for failing to promote women to partnership while others
criticize the law firms themselves for their hierarchical form. Some
feminists urge greater respect for the work of mothers and wives
while others seek to increase women's access to paid labor and
men's participation in unpaid child-care.
Each of these fights, however, can be understood as disagreements about tactics within a larger framework of agreement about
ends. Given historic exclusions and discriminations against women,
and given the limitations of legal and political levers for change, it
should not be surprising that many tactical choices involve alternatives, each of which carries potentially negative consequences. Nor
should it be surprising that different individuals and groups evaluate the risks and opportunities in such choices differently. These
contrasting evaluations give rise to disagreements over tactics.
In short, the contradiction is not in feminists, but in the multiple patterns of separation and degradation that link women's
only sources of power and strength to our exclusion from male
power.67 The exclusion and subordination of women has taken
multiple-and inconsistent-forms. Women have been devalued
for failing to contribute financially to their families and, when
women do bring home a paycheck, they have been criticized for
taking men's jobs. Women have been derided as weak and vulnerable and have also been castigated when individuals depart from
this stereotype. It is consistent with the inconsistencies of women's
experiences to respond with criticisms on multiple and contrasting
fronts. Despite shifting positions on particular legal arguments,
feminists share a long-term vision of a world in which women are
not devalued, harmed, or excluded from participation on the basis
of their gender or sex. The conflicts reflect the social and historical
arrangements that have presented women-and men-with such

6 See Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History 167-77 (Columbia University Press, 1988); Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 Feminist
Studies 375 (1986); Mary Joe Frug, Gender Difference and the Sears Case (unpublished
manuscript); Thomas Haskell and Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the SEARS Case, 66 Tex L Rev 1629 (1988); Alice Kessler-Harris,
"Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing": A Response to Haskell and Levinson, 67 Tex
L Rev 429 (1988).
6 See Nancy Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: "Women's Sphere" in New England,
1780-1835 (Yale University Press, 1977); Martha Minow, Rights of One's Own (Book Review), 98 Harv L Rev 1084 (1985). See generally Ellen DuBois, Mar Jo Buhle, Temma
Kaplan, Gerda Lerner and Caroll Smith-Rosenberg, Politics and Culture in Women's History: A Symposium, 6 Feminist Stud 26 (1980) (historians examine notion of "women's
sphere" and debate how much it oppressed and how much it empowered women).
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partial and unappealing alternatives.
There are, however, more profound divergences among feminists which do present divergences within feminism worthy of
analysis. Some feminists claim to have access to new correct answers." Others call for a collaborative process through which many
people can work to arrive at an answer." Still others emphasize the
multiplicity of frameworks that defeats any single answer.7 0 These
positions represent deep differences about the nature of knowledge
and about the desired form of political and legal judgments. Yet,
even these deep differences share something important, something
that distinguishes these feminist positions from many other kinds
of positions. Each of these alternatives present questions of judgment as situated in patterns of power. Thus, some feminists claim
to have a correct answer to problems of justice because they have
identified a pattern of unequal power or oppression that they believe is wrong and that allows them to select from among competing frameworks for sorting out conflicting versions of reality.
Others believe that a process through which people with conflicting
views participate as equals in reaching a judgment itself will channel and check the patterns of power that distort perceptions and
thus distort judgments. And still others locate competing perceptions of reality in complex patterns of social relationships, and
identify in these patterns the difficulties of reaching judgments in
any but contextual, contingent ways. The commitment to locate
knowledge and judgment within patterns of social practice may
take feminists in multiple directions, but it is a unifying commitment nonetheless. Moreover, feminists join in challenging historic
exclusions and devaluations of women. This shared commitment
underlies apparently contrasting efforts to improve women's positions and opportunities by revaluing traditional feminine traits or
by demonstrating that women, too, can achieve traditionally male
accomplishments.
To be unified in purpose, however, hardly answers the charges
of inconsistency and incoherence, and I do not pretend to have
fully answered the charges. But what, exactly, is so important or

" See, for example, MacKinnon, 8 Signs 635 (cited in note 59); Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 NYU L Rev 1003 (1986).
6 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U Miami L Rev 29 (1987). See also Mari Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 Harv CR-CL L Rev 323
(1987) (urging white scholars to learn from minority traditions).
70 See Olsen, 2 J Law & Ineq 1 (cited in note 15); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A
Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex L Rev 387 (1984).
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valuable about consistency and coherence-and from whose perspective are those values to be judged? By contesting the very categories for analysis and by insisting on the links between knowledge and the social arrangements within which knowledge is
produced and used, feminists, at times, challenge even these seemingly neutral measures of intellectual integrity, such as the demand
for deductive tidiness. And by urging modes of analysis that pay
attention to the varieties of human experience and to the complex
interplay between experience and knowledge, feminists dispute the
first premises against which consistency and coherence are typically measured.
At issue here is more than a question of merit, cognitive sturdiness, or various scholarly virtues. At issue here are the choices
registered deep within a culture about meaning. Will the culture of
lawyers, scholars, politicians, and those who approve and reinforce
meanings make room for human variety or instead subordinate variety (along with various humans) to a scheme that prefers unity
and order? Feminists, along with many others, are interested in
notions of law that can constrain oppression. Feminists therefore
remain interested in theories of universal rights and abstract moral
claims. But if universality, abstraction, and theory itself are defined in a way that undermines the perspectives of some while
privileging the perspectives of others, these, too, will become subject to feminist questioning and critique. The pronouncement of
consistency as an ideal in our culture has accompanied demands
for doctrines that dre color blind, gender neutral, and respectful of
religious and ethnic difference. Yet, such ideals may themselves
serve to hide actual practices of prejudice and subordination. A
gender-neutral, color-blind rule establishing a minimum height of
5'8" for employment on the police force has a disproportionately
negative impact on women and members of some racial and ethnic
minorities, even though the rule does not say so on its face. The
aspiration to universality itself may stand in the way of its realization if it seals off from view the bias built into legal norms, public
practices, and established institutions.
Rather than pretending to have already achieved universality,
and rather than hide behind notions of internal consistency and
coherence, feminists urge legal officials to acknowledge their partiality. There is more than one perspective on truth, more than one
vantage point necessary to compose knowledge, more than one
context relevant to evaluating fairness. This, of course, is a basic
insight informing the adversary system, and democracy itself.
Feminists suggest that acknowledging the inevitable partiality of

138

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1989:

any human judgment will open avenues for fuller consultation, disagreement, and debate. We need more-not less-richly detailed
contexts for making sense of what happened when we come to a
criminal trial. We need more humility, not less, in evaluating what
is just. This stance may be painful for feminists to take right now.
It would be more comforting to assert that we know what is right,
and we have the new universal scheme that is consistent and coherent and should replace existing legal theories and doctrines.
But this would deny the struggles we know are necessary for making meaning from the variety of our experiences.
IV.

WHAT'S NEXT

I had three goals for this paper. One was to model, in the absence of genuine dialogue, the kind of serious criticisms of feminism that I hope others will pursue, and in that way, take feminism seriously. Another was to offer a glimpse of the excitement
and rich variety in feminist legal work at this moment even in the
process of taking the perspective of potential critics of feminism.
The third was to help an audience understand why feminists do
not aspire to produce a new, coherent theory of law with universal
principles and responses to all the standard questions of law and
legal theory. We are too busy creating new approaches to teaching,
practice, and normative judgments that shift the terms of what has
prevailed in the past.
What do I foresee as a future for this emerging set of feminist
activities in law? I predict that future lawyers and legal scholars
will take feminism seriously. Feminists will continue to generate
ideas and practices that reinvent the terms of justice, while also
remaking teaching methods and materials, reinvigorating scholarship and litigation, and demonstrating the importance and power
of "bumbling through." 71 And when feminist work is taken seriously, some portion of feminist purposes will be achieved.

"' See Resnik, 1989 U Chi Legal F at 6 (cited in note 52).

